










                                                    Co-Reading Aristotle’s Practical Reasoning  
                  Mostafa Younesie, assistant professor Tarbiat Modares University – Tehran 
      In Islamic Arabic /Persian thought speculations about ethics may be divided into textual / scriptural; theological; religious; and philosophical too. The “philosophical ethics” has within itself Socratic, Platonic, Aristotelian and neo-Platonic trends and versions with such main thinkers such as Farabi; Avicenna; and Averroes. Here we will concentrate on Farabi and those aspects of his speculations that are Aristotelian and can be reordered and arranged around “practical reasoning”. In other words, we want to consider Farabi’s interpretation and appropriation of the Aristotelian practical reasoning in the framework of his philosophical ethics. For he has a specific conception of philosophy according to it “philosophy must necessarily come into being in every man in the way possible for him”(Mahdi, P. 130). This sentence in the context of his narration about Aristotle’s philosophy is very interesting and thought provoking for it formally it shows that Aristotle’s account of philosophy is not the closure of philosophy but we have to consider and take it as stimulation for beginning philosophy by ourselves. Therefore philosophy is not something ready-made, finished and completed product and thing at hand for using and consuming but is the method, way and quest for knowledge and wisdom and not the knowledge and wisdom itself.      
But why “practical reasoning”? Since as responsible thinking human beings with different and various positions and states we face with variegated events and happenings that some main and basic issue or subject is concerned and accordingly with different intentions and purposes we engage with them. In other words, as thinking and responsible human beings we encounter various and diverse issues in specific times and places and somehow we feel concern about them. These parts and constituents together shape the basic parts of what can be called ethics in its classical Aristotelian developed phase. By combining Greek history and semantics, it means that we are situated in different places (ethos) and according to our character and psychological states (ethikos) should do what is good and refrain of what is bad (ethics) (A. Loizou & H. Lesser P.35). 
      But in order to complement Farabi’s account of ethics we have to consider it as a distinct and independent discipline too. In this regard he examines ethics in the context of his discussion about the eight hierarchical or vertical parts of logic. In the context of logic, he mentions that in comparison with the other kinds of knowledge ethics pertains to the dialectic branch or faculty on the basis of probable discourse with the purpose of forming strong opinions through a kind of syllogism from generally accepted premises (I. M. Dahiyat, P. 17). Accordingly, ethics is different from the other four branches of logic such as demonstration; sophistic; rhetoric; and poetic. With regard to the “context theory”, we have to keep this division and branches in our mind and thereby consider category by category ethics in relation to its specific and definite type of discourse, purpose and device.          
      And it is on this context that we will co-read Farabi’s “appropriative interpretation” of the Aristotelian practical reasoning. But in relation to Farabi’s texts we should mention to some methodological cautions for reading his texts is not easy, straight, and direct but difficult and indirect to the extent that makes many of the Arabic readers confused, perplexed and disappointed so that they put his texts away and never return to them again. What is our choice? There is a favorable point in his texts that make our choice somehow easy and it is this fact that Farabi’s notions about theoretical and practical reasoning hold a large place in his writings. Therefore with keeping our specific purpose in our minds we confront simply and directly and then organize and make his related writings into a meaningful whole in regard to practical reasoning.    
     Like many heirs to Aristotelian tradition within philosophy, Farabi’s understanding of knowledge hinges on the distinction between theoretical and practical reasoning (P.E. Walker, P. 91, with some changes) but at the same time there is a specific kind of interrelation between them. Thereby the basis of his conception is different from the customary and available classifications that are based on the emic internal and etic external standards with some ideological connotations. In other words, Farabi’s conception of practical reasoning is based on an understanding of knowledge or philosophy itself that according to factors such as purpose; and method will be divided into these three: theoretical (knowledge requiring knowledge with the aim of certainty), practical (knowledge requiring action; opinion and beliefs with the aim of action), or both (knowledge requiring knowledge and action). More precisely, in regard to practical reasoning we can say that its subject is deliberation, method practical syllogism; and purpose action. On this basis, he has a philosophical logical conception of practical reasoning.  
                  But it may be considered a very simple customary and unproblematic account of Farabi’s thinking about practical reasoning. According to Walker, beside this account “he recognizes a distinction between theoretical knowledge and practice and then has identified something he understands as practical reasoning which is the mental component of the latter. Finally, he asserts a connection between theoretical and practical reason in order to establish a philosophical interest in the latter, even though there remains some mystery as to what that connection really is” (walker, P. 113). Accordingly, the image is not so clear and understandable.                
             Now with regard to this crucial point, it seems that for better understanding of Farabi’s conception of practical reasoning it would better we consider it from two angles: a) dichotomy of phusis and thesis; and b) as a subdivision of reflective faculty/virtue.  
A)	It is possible to differentiate between those beings that are independent of human will and volition and those that are dependent on them. According to Farabi when we see different phenomena in the world we understand that they are not equals since some are independent of our volition and somehow they are “given” to us – here relatively equals to Greek “phusis”, and at the same time there are things that are “made” by our human will – here relatively equal to Greek “thesis” (M. Galston, P. 68). In other words, since Farabi does not consider realities monolithic and undifferentiated on the basis of dichotomy between “phusis” and “thesis” he classifies phenomena and reasonings. Accordingly, “theoretical reasoning” is concerned with objects, beings and events that are manifestations of “phusis”; and “practical reasoning” with those that are effects of “thesis”. Besides, for Farabi like Aristotle these two kinds of reasonings are not completely two separated disconnected sphere but they are related in a specific way that we will mention to it later on.    
   Therefore in Farabi “practical reasoning” is concerned with things that are dependent on human volition and when we want to “actualize” such a thing we “deliberate” (not theorizing) about its realization with the consideration of a “universal aim and end”. Thereby in conformity with and observation of the universal telos we use our practical reasoning in order to actualize the related thing. But as it is mentioned, we have to bear in our mind that this sphere is not independent of the phusis or theoretical sphere but at the same time their interplays are not something extant, clear and straight. It seems that for Farabi in human sphere there is an interplay between theoretical and practical reasoning that is, we consider some things and events that are independent of our will, such as the motions of the heavens, but it is not all, since our “understanding” of their motions and “laws” of motions are dependent on us and human understanding and laws may be changed. In other words, discovering and speculating about the motions of heavens is the concern of theoretical reasoning but making and realizing rules and principles of these motions is the concern of practical reasoning. Thereby practical reasoning (in comparison with pragmatism) externalizes and actualizes the abstract rules and principles of theoretical reasoning that are understood and speculated by human beings. What about the second angle? 
B)	Farabi along the familiar Aristotelian lines divides virtues to moral and intellectual and then divides the intellectual into theoretical and reflective ones. In this scheme practical reasoning is a subdivision of reflective or deliberative virtues that “is pertinent to the study of ethics or the determination of the right kind of action” (M. Fakhry, PP. 82, 83). Thereby we are situated exactly in the field of ethics and the meaning of practical reasoning is understandable in this context. According to these lines, it is clear that ethics is concerned with acting the “right action” and not acting the” wrong” one. Therefore for Farabi ethics should have a “practical” background for we are not concerned exclusively and merely with knowing the right or wrong action. What can be this practical genus? With regard to the quality of practical reasoning basically its genus should be both intelligible and voluntary since for Farabi practical reasoning should be essentially intellectual and somehow in the continuation of the theoretical therefore it is not divorced and disconnected from it otherwise there will be something else. But these intelligibles are not necessary universal theoretical ones but are variable quasi -universal voluntary since our human will and volition brings them into existence and actualizes them at a determinate time and place (M. Fakhry, P. 80). 
      Accordingly, the genus of practical reasoning is “voluntary intelligibles” that are not given or available but through human volition should be made and come into existence. In this context practical reasoning is a subdivision of reflective virtue/faculty and enables us to grasp, “as a result of the prolonged experience and observation of sensible entities, the premises, whether universal or particular, of right action”….(M. Fakhry, P. 83). For Farabi as human beings we are engaged in different, various and particular situations that demand our “right” action (in contrast to mere intellection or inaction or wrong action) but this “good” action is not possible without knowing the related pertinent “premises” of it. But here is also a crucial point in the mentioned quotation. With regard to our initial exposition on how Farabi places ethics in the hierarchical divisions of the Aristotelian formal logic and consider it at the second rank between demonstration as the first upper and sophistic as the third lower (following by rhetoric and poetics), it seems necessary to consider “practical reasoning” (rather equivalent with Arabic “ta’aqqul” and Greek “phronesis”) in this context too. 
           According to the familiar medieval vertical ordering, in Farabi practical reason at the second rank is dependent on the first upper rank that is theoretical reason and function as the foundation for practical reason and then both are in interplay with each other (in the continuation of this hierarchical ordering practical reasoning itself works as the basis for sophistic and the latter is dependent on it). It means that “human beings know happiness by theoretical reasoning, desire it by the appetitive faculty, deliberate by the practical-rational faculty upon what to do in order to attain it, and use the instruments of the appetitive faculty to do the actions have been discovered by deliberation…”(D. L. Black. 134, n. 94). Therefore practical reasoning possesses necessarily both theoretical universal and deliberative particular excellences/faculties in applying theory to the particular place/time and the matters at hand. 
      As a conclusion, Farabi considers knowledge as a whole (not monolithic totality) with some parts that have distinctions from and connections with each other. Accordingly, he examines practical reasoning in distinction and connection with the other parts of knowledge such as theoretical and productive ones. At the same time, he does it on the ground of both philosophy and logic, philosophy as an uncompleted individual human quest for wisdom; and logic in the form of combination of both demonstration and dialectic as instruments and tools for guiding us in our searching.                                      
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